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THE REFERENCE OF "GOD"
Richard B. Miller

Analytically inclined philosphers of religion have commonly assumed that 1) '"God" must
be defined before arguments for or against his existence can be evaluated 2) the history
of religious beliefs is irrelevant to their justification. In this paper I apply the causal
theory of reference to "God" and challenge both assumptions. If, as Freud supposes,
"God" originates in the delusions of the mentally ill then it does not refer. On the other
hand, if "God" originates in encounters with some Entity, no matter how vaguely conceived, then That is God.

This paper began several years ago with a simple idea. I had recently become
convinced of the superiority of the views of Kripke, Donnellan and Putnam on
reference to the descriptivist way in which it was traditionally conceived and I
asked myself what significance this might have for the philosophy of religion.
The standard analytic move of transforming the question "Does God exist?" into
"Does 'God' refer? was an easy first step. From there I had only to apply the
causal theory of reference to "God" and see what new insights developed.
The results have surprised me. This simple experiment has radically altered
my views on the philosophy of religion. Assumptions which I never questioned
I have abandoned; authors and arguments I took to be naive and irrelevant I now
read seriously. I offer this paper in the hope that others will find the experiment
as stimulating as I have found it. Not everyone will, certainly. Those who do
not share the assumptions under which I formerly operated will find the theory
less challenging. Also, those who have not been convinced by the causal theory
of reference (CTR) will not be persuaded. I hope that there will be some interest
in what I am trying to do, however, since the CTR is now widely, though not
universally, accepted and has not yet, to my knowledge, been applied to the
philosophy of religion.
A particularly clear example of the set of assumptions which CTR disturbs
can be found in the Russell-Copleston BBC debate on the existence of God.
Lord Russell and Father Copleston disagree about a great many things in that
exchange, but it is on what they agree that I now wish to focus. I think that
there are four mutually agreed assumptions which structure their dispute. I 1)
Religion is philosophically interesting insofar as it consists of significant beliefs
about reality. 2) The philosopher's job is to examine those beliefs in order to
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determine whether or not they are rationally justified. 3) Existence claims are
to be examined by moving them to the linguistic level. 4) Existence claims, now
understood as reference claims, can be evaluated only after the meaning of key
terms, viz., "God," have been fixed by definition. Philosophy is in general
understood as define-your-terms-and-deduce-the-consequences, and philosophy
of religion becomes in large measure the definition of "God" as the omnipotent,
omniscient, omnibenevolent, Creator of the world and the critical examination
of the traditional arguments for His existence.
There have been other attempts to break out of the constraining set of assumptions which I describe above. Paul Tillich 2 and John Wisdom' independently but
in parallel have tried to find a different language for philosophy of religion by
rejecting the first assumption that I mentioned. Tillich, taking his inspiration
from Heidegger, and Wisdom, taking his inspiration from Wittgenstein,. were
concerned to give an analysis of religion which denied that it included beliefs
in the normal sense at all. Hence the rational justification of these beliefs via
the traditional arguments could be set aside. This sort of "enlightened" position
that defends religion from rational criticism by denying that it says anything
seems to be enjoying less favor than it once did. It is not my intention to provide
a similarly "enlightened" reanalysis of religious language and belief. I still accept
assumptions 1-3. The rejection of 4)" is, as I will show, radical enough.
"Define your terms." To many philosophers this seems to be an innocent
request. The need for definitions of key terms is not considered controversial.
It ought to be., It is necessary to pin down a term so that one can tell to what it
refers, but the way to do this is not necessarily by defining it.
The descriptivist theory of reference (DTR) hohls that words refer to objects
via some sort of description. The "description" could be a set of ideas in the
speaker's mind, or a set of his beliefs, or, for those skeptical of such entities as
minds, a set of behaviorally defined crheria of identification. Reference is, in
descriptivist terms, a matter of matching or corresponding to or being picked
out by the relevant description.
Reference can be either singular or general. A name or a description can refer
singularly to individuals or generally to classes. "Egg-laying, hairy, warmblooded, duck-billed animal which nurses its young" refers to platypuses because
while they are not the only egg-layers they are the only beasts which fit the
complete description. DTR would further explain the ability of speakers to use
"platypus" to refer to the same class by interpreting "platypus" as an abbreviation
for the description just mentioned.
DTR holds that in normal cases of singular reference if there is a referent it
is that individual which uniquely fits the description. One can refer to Aristotle
as "the student of Plato and the teacher of Alexander" or as "Aristotle." Names
according to this theory are but disguised descriptions. Not all cases of singular
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reference work out so well for DTR, and the theory must deal with hard cases
as well. A description may be incomplete so that in fact many individuals fit
the description though it is intended, and succeeds, in referring to one individual.
"The student of Plato" can be used to refer to Aristotle though he was not the
only such student. Worse yet, partially or even wholly false descriptions may
refer. "The boy who chopped down his father's cherry tree and couldn't tell a
lie" refers to Washington though false and many could not supply a true identifying
description.
Sophisticated descriptivists try to handle the problems of incomplete and inaccurate descriptive phrases and of the inability of speakers to supply complete
and accurate descriptive equivalents of names by making reference depend on
implied open-ended sets of descriptions which may not be fully conscious to
language users. When using a name or an incomplete or inaccurate descriptive
phrase the speaker may be alleged to "have in mind" some description which is
sufficient to pick out the intended referent and only the intended referent. In the
case of our first President a speaker might, if challenged on the historical inaccuracy of the cherry tree myth, claim to have meant "the President commonly
purported to have chopped down his father's cherry tree."
Descriptivists explain the function of referential expressions as implicit or
explicit descriptions. The variations in the way DTR handles cases which do not
readily fit such a pattern have necessarily been excluded from this brief account,
but I hope the general outline of this common theory has been made sufficiently
clear.
The causal theory of reference (CTR) on the other hand holds that words refer
to objects via their causal-historical connections with those objects. The necessary
causal-historical connections are understood differently and some what vaguely
by different proponents of CTR. The two early developers of the theory have
recently disputed as to whether the theory should be expressed in semantic or
in pragmatic terms. 6.Counter-attacks on CTR have come from descriptivists and
a new rival to both CTR and DTR has appeared in the work of Colin McGinn. 7
Into the details of this lively and current debate among philosophers of language
I do not intend to allow myself to be drawn in this paper. Any attempt to defend
CTR from its critics would distract me from the task at hand, viz., the application
of CTR to the reference of "God."
The theory as I will employ-it is largely Keith Donnellan's though, as indicated,
an elaborate exposition or defense will not be attempted. This version of CTR
states that there is one way, not the only way, in which words can be used to
pick out things in which the causal-historical relations of referents and languageusers are paramount. The basic cases of reference are the direct references of a
language user to some referent, typically physically present in his immediate
environment. The conditions under which direct reference takes place seem
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intUItIve, but it is difficult to state exactly what they are. (The problem will
appear in another fom1 later in this exposition when I will have occasion to
describe "blocks.") Both names and descriptions can be used to directly refer to
objects, but examples using names in direct reference are perhaps clearer. Suppose
an explorer untrained in biology discovers curious beaver-like creatures which
he tags with the name "platypus." The name sticks and can be used to successfully
refer to platypuses though the explorer may know very little about them and be
far from able to supply a unique identifying description. Indeed, for a long time
no one may be able to supply such a description. Infom1ally we all know how
such tagging takes place and generally agree on what C:lses are and are not direct
references even if we cannot describe necessary and sufficient conditions for
this to take place.
Donnellan has also pointed out how descriptive phrases can be used in the
same way. Direct reference is not limited to those words which are grammatically
names. A description may be used referentially (non-descriptively) as the name
of something which does not fit the description. Donnellan gives interesting
examples of this. A speaker can use some descriptive phrase referentially in a
question ("Who is the man drinking the martini?" refers in fact to a man drinking
mineral water out of a martini glass.); an assertion ("Smith's murderer is insane."
can refer to the prisoner in the courtroom who is acting so oddly even if he is
innocent.); or command ("Bring me the book on the table." can be a request for
the book beside the table.) Instead of postulating implicit identifying descriptions
which neither speakers nor listeners may be able to supply without prompting
the CTR denies that any expressed or implied true description need be present
in anyone's mind for reference to succeed. 8
Direct references, clear in particular cases though vague in the abstract, make
possible remote references. Chains of remote reference may be built up from
the anchor of a direct reference. Defenders of CTR hold that "George Washington"
can still be used referentially though, obviously, George Washington is no longer
present. When I refer to him now the fact that I have referred to him and not
to Thomas Paine is due to the causal-historical chain leading from some direct
references to George, and not to Thomas, via a chain of uses of the name, written
and oral, culminating in my own case. I have many true beliefs about George
Washington, not to mention the false ones, and so did other language users in
the chain, but these true beliefs are neither necessary nor sufficient to make my
use of "George Washington" refer to the famous Virginia farmer. My four year
old daughter, for example, was told the cherry tree fable by her nursery school
teacher and this represents the sum total of her "knowledge" of George
Washington. Despite this, she can refer to George Washington because her use
is traceable to her teacher's which is part of a chain which originates in a fabled
but not imaginary George Washington.
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It is not always the case that a single direct reference anchors the chain. The
original direct reference may not be traceable to a single individual. In normal
cases remote references are grounded in multiple direct references which may
even be widely separated in time. For example, remote references to Jerusalem
are grounded in direct references to that city in the present and stretching back
into antiquity.
Neither direct nor remote references fail due to mistaken beliefs about the
referent so long as appropriate causal-historical conditions hold. Reference fails
according to CTR only when the investigation of the causal ancestry of the name
of description's use leads to what Donnellan calls a "block." He defines a block
as "events that preclude any referent's being identified."9 As far as I know no
one has been able to supply necessary and sufficient conditions which would
enable us to clearly distinguish histories which constitute blocks from those
which do not but are merely defective or unusual in other ways. This weakness
has not prevented the theory from making converts, myself among them, though
I confess that I would feel more comfortable if the theory were more precise on
this point. Donnellan is untroubled by the charge that the theory is vague at this
crucial point and proceeds to clarify by examples. If a history ends in a fiction
told as a reality, or an egregious misperception as in a trick of light being taken
for a person or a scholar's assumption that a collection of fragments had a
common author when it does not then these referential chains end in blocks.
The point is that it is not merely that some speaker has made a serious mistake
in identifying the referent but that he has used the name or description in a
context in which there is no plausible candidate for referent.
Donnellan formulates the following rule for negative existence statements.
(R) If N is a proper name that has been used in predicative statements
with the intention to refer to some individual, then 'N does not exist'
is true if and only if the history of those uses ends in a block. 10
As I will show this rule establishes the philosophical relevance of the history of
religion to the existence of God. In the next section I will explain how the
application of CTR to religious language has important consequences for the
philosophy of religion.
II

A subject of such enduring interest as religion has naturally developed a long
and complex tradition of philosophical reflection. The part of that tradition which
had always seemed to me the most deserving of attention was that of natural
theology, by which I mean the philosophical examination of arguments for and
against traditional religious beliefs especially the existence of God. Key terms
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were defined and arguments carefully expounded, criticized and restated. On
the other hand there existed another vigorous strand of philosophical reflection
on religion which I felt justified in ignoring. The work of Feuerbach, Marx,
Nietzsche, and Freud represents a continuous tradition, which can be labeled
"critique ," 11 that I felt could be dismissed as not really philosophical. These
thinkers investigated or speculated about the origins of religion in general and
of Christianity in particular. They took their work to be, and many intellectuals
both within and outside of philosophy agreed, a convincing refutation of the
rationality of religious belief. I took this claim to be naive and when one of my
students echoed some version of critique I was dismissive.
Such speculations, I held, could have psychological interest but they have no
bearing on whether or not it is rational to believe that God exists. Hans Kung,
a noted Catholic theologian who has devoted great attention to the tradition of
critique, is similarly dismissive of the claim that critique has such relevance.
It does not follow-as some theologians have mistakenly concludedfrom man's profound desire for God and eternal life, that God exists
and eternal life and happiness are real. But some atheists, too, are
mistaken in thinking that what follows is the nonexistence of God and
the unreality of eternal life ....
Here, then, again, as earlier with Feuerbach and Marx, we have
reached the crux of the problem, which is not at all difficult to understand
and in the face of which any kind of projection theory, opium theory
or illusion theory momentarily loses its suggestive power. Perhaps this
being of our longings and dreams does actually exist. ...
It should be observed that Freud has not in fact destroyed or refuted
religious ideas in principle, and neither atheists nor theologians should
ever read this into his critique of religion. For, by its very nature,
psychological interpretation alone cannot penetrate to the absolutely
final or first reality: on this point it must remain neutral in principle. 12

To accept this belief in the metaphysical neutrality of critique leads to some
unfortunate consequences. On the one hand some will be inclined to accept the
truth of these psychological or historical accounts too readily since they wrongly
believe that their truth makes no difference. This may result in dubious claims
slipping by unchallenged. On the other hand it can lead to a failure to make the
claims inherent in the theory clear. A general laxness prevails when the participants do not know what questions to ask or are not convinced that anything of
moment is at stake.
CTR changes all this. Applying Donnellan's Rule R to "God" we have the
following principle.
(G) If "God" is a proper name that has been used in predicative statements
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with the intention to refer to some individual then "God does not exist"
is true if and only if the history of those uses ends in a block.
The antecedent is unquestionably true. Feuerbach, Marx, Nietzsche and Freud
can all be interpreted as arguing that this history of uses of the proper name
"God" ends in a block. Of course none had CTR in mind when he wrote but I
think that without much reconstruction one can see each as claiming this.
Depending on the version of critique in question the history leads us back to
man's projection of his own nature on tht: world as a whole or to the jealousy
and cowardice of the masses, or to the illusions of satisfaction concocted out of
the frustration of human needs in oppress,ive economic conditions, or to unresolved Oedipal anxieties and/or infantile experiences of contentment. Although
the notion of a block is not analyzed into necessary and sufficient conditions it
seems plain that if all the referential chains of "God" 's uses terminated in the
egregious misidentification of some internal state of the speaker then no referent
has been identified. If a strong enough version of critique were true "God" would
not refer. Pace Kung, critique is not metaphysically neutral.
One obvious objection must surely be faced. 13 Is it not possible, though this
admittedly goes against our expectations of how God would choose to reveal
Himself, that God planned for the human race to formulate an idea of Him in,
for example, the way Freud describes? In ,:reating the world according to Divine
plan does not God become part of the causal history of "God" even if the
immediate causes are just as critique hypothesizes. If all events are part of God's
plan then natural causes such as Oedipal conflicts could be used as instruments
of the Divinity to reveal Himself. Does not this possibility show that Freud's
hypothesis is compatible with "God" referring and that no account of naturalistic
causes of religious experience or belief constitutes a block?
I answer by admitting that there could exist a Being with some or even all of
the attributes commonly ascribed to God to have planned that humans should
evolve, develop Oedipal feelings and resolve them in many instances by coming
to believe in God, speaking of God and passing on this language and these
beliefs to others. I deny that this possibility shows the metaphysical neutrality
of critique. If there were a Being who matched our beliefs in God so fortuitously
it would not be God. Donnellan is perfectly correct when he says that, in a
parallel case, if parents made up the Santa Claus legend and told it to children
as fact that constitutes a block even if there does happen to be a jolly old elf
who delivers presents on Christmas Eve. this elf is not Santa. Indeed, there is
no Santa Claus.
But does the Divine Being's choice of Oedipal conflicts as the natural means
of bringing about belief in Himself not constitute a crucial difference? Unlike
the elf the Divine Being would playa part in the chain of causes leading up to
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the word's use even though the role is very indirect. Not every causal relation
between an object and a word's use will suffice to establish reference and it
seems clear that in such a case reference could not be grounded in such a
circuitous causal history. One must bear in mind that on the assumption of the
creation of the world according to this being's plan it would bear exactly the
same causal relation to "Santa Claus," "Paul Bunyon," "unicorn," and all other
words without another claimant for the role of referent. Intuitions differ about
whether Donnellan's elf is Santa or not but no one would want to maintain that
this divine being was also a unicorn. God knew from creation and intended to
bring about by natural means uses of all fictitious terms but He is not all fictitious
beings. Likewise if a divine being were to bring about use of "God" in a way
similar to the way mythical uses arise then I do not see why "God" would not
also fail to refer.
Another objection is that, as I have admitted, CTR is not the whole story on
reference. It is more plausible to hold that it is only one, though the most common
and important, mechanism of reference. The failure of "God" to refer in virtue
of its causal-historical relations to God, if that is what critique establishes, does
not show that "God" does not refer. If "God" were typically used attributively
as an abbreviation for "whatever or whoever is the omnipotent, omniscient
Creator etc." then my conclusions would have to be revised. I will admit that
"God" is often used this way by philosophers but I suspect that only philosophers
use "God" this way and that they only do so acting in that capacity. I have no
objection to those who take words in common usage and employ them in different
ways for specialized uses provided this serves some purpose. I am not sure what
purpose is served by discussing the existence of the god of the philosophers.
The concern of most common people, and I include myself in that category, is
rather with the existence of the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. If I am
correct "God" is used referentially and not attributively outside of specialized
philosophical contexts in this culture.
III

It is a commonplace that Judaism, Christianity and Islam are the three great
historical religions. They are also the most important in world culture at present
both in terms of numbers of adherents and of vitality. But by saying that they
are the historical religions we do not say that they are the most important historical
religious forces, we say that the religions are themselves historical. Traditional
Judaism, Christianity and Islam describe God interacting with human communities and revealing Himself to them from time to time. He reveals His name
to humans but He cannot communicate His nature to them as this is beyond
human comprehension. "God," "Yahweh," "Allah," are names of a Being
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encountered by certain actual historical individuals; Moses, Abraham, Paul,
Mohammed. "God," and similar names are used referentially to pick out the
God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob and not attributively to pick out whatever or
whoever is omnipotent, etc.
To grasp this point is to see that the objection that CTR with its naturalistic
motivations is inevitably biased against religion in favor of critique is incorrect.
CTR is the implicit theory of both critique and of the historical religions which
it attacks. This also tends to explain why non-philosophers are inclined to see
more relevance in critique than in, for example, the ontological argument. Unlike
philosophers blinded by a descriptive theory of reference they see the historical
validity of religion as essential rather than incidental.
CTR shows critique to be a philosophically sophisticated challenge to the
self-understanding of the historical religions. It attacks these religions on their
own ground. It denies the truth of what they have always considered essential.
Beginning with textual criticism, applying serious objective standards to the
Bible as a literary-historical document, the extent of the 'mythical and poetic
nature of the text was revealed. The human authors, understandably enough, did
not write history in the modem style with respect for modem standards of
accuracy. Their purposes were simply different from those of modem historians.
The validity of much of the textual criticism is apparent to all but the most
doctrinaire conservatives. Radical critique simply took this one step further in
speculating that the story of God's interaction with man is entirely a creature of
fantasy.
There is a tendency on the part of those who still identify with one of these
religious traditions to accept critique in whole or in part. Indeed to reject it as
completely false, to say that neurotic impulses and/or wishful thinking have
absolutely no part in anyone's religious beliefs is a rather desperate response. I
hope that in the previous section I have shown how the extreme liberal reaction
to accept critique completely and so interpret all the miraculous and revelatory
parts of the history as having naturalistic causes and still accept the tradition is
problematic. The consequence of such a view, whether intended or not, is that
God does not exist.
These considerations have forced me, and I hope will force others, to face
the question: Is there a version of critique which is at once plausible and powerful
enough to refute the reference claims of the historical religions? I would answer
that at present there is not. The suggestion which I made earlier that critique
describes the history of religious language, in the Judeo-Christian tradition at
least, as originating in a block is complicated by the fact that "God" is multiply
grounded in direct references. The Judeo-Christian understanding of history is
that God has repeatedly encountered man, in the prophets of the Old Testament
and beyond. Others would add that God directly encounters many anonymous
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men and women in their daily lives in the present as well as in the past. This
complicates matters for critique. If the causal chain leading back from present
uses converged on just one or at most a few cases, as in the case of the scholar
mistakenly concluding that a heap of fragments from diverse sources all had a
common author whom he proceeds to call Homer, it would be far easier to show
that the history ended in a block. If the reference claim rests exclusively on the
story of Moses then the debunking of that tale would be sufficient to refute it.
A version of critique which would be strong enough to deny the reference of
"God" would have to be very strong indeed. It would have to show that all the
ostensible direct references to "God" were radically defective. Existing versions
of critique have a power and plausibility that should not be underrated. Clearly,
projection, delusion and plain wishful thinking are elements of the religious life
of many. Significantly, there have been numerous instances of bizarre and
pathological behavior among those who have claimed direct contact with the
Deity. It would be foolish to deny critique its element of truth but the prospects
for a complete debunking of religion along these lines are dim.
Any economic or sociological critique which traces religious experience back
to specific historical conditions in a society at a particular point in its development,
as in Marx and Nietzsche, will fail to account for all direct reference claims.
No such theory that I could forsee would be adequate to explain Ezekiel, Paul,
and Francis of Assisi in terms of common cultural forces acting on all three.
Freud's critique is the most serious challenge. Read with sympathy it is more
psychological than historical. 14 His theories would trace the origins of religious
experience and belief to very basic human experiences; feelings of warmth,
closeness and oneness with a human mother and/or feelings of guilt, love,
aggression and fear of a human father. A psychological theory of this type might
be in a better position to explain how religious experience could arise in a wide
variety of cultures as long as humans are born of woman and have mixed feelings
about their fathers. A Freudian theory could more easily explain the (nearly?)
universal existence of religion in human culture.
While in the long run Freudianism of all the versions of critique offers the
stiffest challenge, at present it falls far short of blocking the reference claims of
religion. The problem is that while some very common and basic experiences
can be noted as likely causes of religious experience and belief these are plainly
not sufficient causal conditions and we do not even know what sufficient
psychological causes of religious beliefs would be like. Obviously not all humans
with these common experiences tum out the same. Religious experience is
unlikely to have uniform psychic causes because religious experience is itself
extremely diverse. The religious man is not a simple character type like "the
miser," or "the magnanimous man" who could in principle be explained in a
unilinear way. At times through loss of perspective it may appear as if all those
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who claim direct experience of God are cut from the same cloth; if, for example,
one were to focus exclusively on a small religious community for a short period
of time like mid-17th Century Puritans in Massachusetts. But a glance at such
works as William James' Varieties of Religious Experience quickly puts this
delusion to rest. I am no more sanguine that we will find factors common to the
personalities of Ezekiel, Paul and Francis of Assisi than that we should discover
common factors in their economies.
Let me make my final position on this issue plain. In principle critique could
refute reference claims for "God." In practice it falls far short of doing so chiefly
due to the unacknowledged variety of persons claiming to ground such reference
claims. Successful critique would have to recognize the diversity of religious
experience and provide separate and sufficient naturalistic explanations of the
most important types. This is a bigger job than Feuerbach, Marx, Nietzsche, or
Freud attempted. But critique fails not because it can be philosophically proven
to be metaphysically irrelevant. Its weaknesses are factual and theoretical and
could be remedied by some broader, more sophisticated future critique.
IV

I would like to conclude this paper by briefly mentioning what I consider a
more positive contribution of CTR to the philosophy of religion. While CTR
increases the seriousness of critique's challenge it diminishes another. One of
the greatest difficulties facing the rational defender of religious belief is the
embarrassing mUltiplicity of faiths. No matter how cogently one justifies one's
belief the objection threatens that there are, after all, so many different religions
and only one at most could possibly be true.
The accusation goes back at least as far as Epicurus and was used with masterful
grace by Hume in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. The mUltiplicity
of religious belief is used as an argument against all. If the reasons used to
support one religion can be used, mutatis mutandis, to support contradictory
religious traditions just as well then such reasons cannot be used to rationally
support any. Reasons, whether moral experience, religious experience, miracles,
the order of the natural world or revelation, which support both Zeus and Yahweh
support neither. Skillfully used this argument can make any option other than
atheism seem ethnocentric at best and bigoted at worst. My feeling is that such
an argument, regardless of how much we suspect its cogency, is very persuasive.
One response to the embarrassment is to limit the claims of natural theology
to the defense of a minimal set of beliefs compatible with all major religions.
The tactic is to avoid such divide-and-conquer gambits by finding a defensible
lowest common denominator of man's religious belief. The reason I have trouble
accepting a lowest common denominator is that I can see none that would strike
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most people as both true and meaningful. It is at this point that CTR comes to
our aid. CTR allows us to dispose of the embarrassment of a God of the Hebrews,
God of the Arabs, God of the Hindus etc. These could all be different names
for the same Being even ifthere is no significant overlap in beliefabout His nature.
Despite wide and deep differences of belief about the nature of "Yahweh,"
"Allah," "Brahma," or even such impersonally conceived entities as "Tao," and
"Nirvana," they may all be different names for a Being, variously and dimly
understood by different cultures, who has interacted with human communities
throughout history. I do not find it implausible that there have been genuine
Divine-human encounters with diverse human cultures. If that is in fact true then
we could agree that all men address the same God no matter how differently
they conceive Him. Nor do we have to as a consequence minimize or ignore
the importance of the differences. They remain significant and imminently discussible even if they do not determine reference. Many can find unity in a
common object of worship within diversity of conception and practice.
East Carolina University

NOTES
1. Bertrand Russell and F. C. Copleston, "The Existence of God." in Philosophy of Religion, ed.
John Hick (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp. 282-301.
2. Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979).
3. John Wisdom, "Gods," Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society, (1944-5).
4. It no longer seems odd to find Wittgensteineans and Heideggereans not only talking about the
same issue but saying essentially the same thing since the publication of Richard Rorty's Philosophy
and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981).
5. Readers who are unfamiliar with the causal theory of reference would profit from Stephan
Swartz' introduction to Naming, Necessity and Natural Kinds (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1977) upon which my brief descriptions in this paper are largely based.
6. Kripke's criticism of Donnellan occurs in "Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference," Midwest Studies in Philosophy II, (1977). Donnellan's position is found in "Reference and Definite
Description," and "Speaking of Nothing" both in Swartz, op. cit. and in 'The Contingent A Priori
and Rigid Designators," Midwest Studies in Philosophy II, (1977). He answers Kripke's objections
in "Speaker's References, Description and Anaphora," in Syntax and Semantics, ed. Cole (New
York: Academic Press, 1978).
7. Colin McGinn not only develops a competing theory in "The Mechanism of Reference," Synthese,
49, 1981, but also summarizes the major criticisms of CTR adding some of his own.
8. All these examples are from "Reference and Definite Descriptions."
9. "Speaking of Nothing," p. 237.
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10. "Speaking of Nothing," p. 239. Donnellan adds minor qualifications omitted here.
11. All these figures are discussed at length in Hans Kiing's Does God Exist?, trans. Edward Quinn
(New York: Vintage Books, 1981).
12. Kung, pp. 301-2.
13. lam endebted to the editor for bringing this objection, which I now see as obvious, to my attention.
14. My understanding of Freud has been sharpened by W. P. Alston's "Psychoanalytic Theory and
Theistic Belief," in Faith and the Philosophers, ed. 10hnHick, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964).

